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Abstract
! e article examines jihad within what is loosely referred to as “the Western imagination.” 
! rough the analysis of both popular stereotypes and the broader historical context of 
religious antagonism and (neo)colonialism, the paper discusses both contemporary politi-
cal rhetoric and a pair of liberal post September-11 political cartoons. While European and 
North American political leaders have often stereotyped Muslims in order to justify various 
“axis of evil” bandwagons and further political and economic interests throughout the 
Islamic Crescent, I argue here that the liberal media’s critiques also often rely on fallacious 
embodied stereotypes. ! e pervasiveness of such representations has important implica-
tions for the lived realities and human rights of both Muslims and non-Muslims globally 
because these stereotypes mask Muslim’s legitimate concerns regarding (neo)colonialism 
and because of the human rights abuses that result from Islamophobia. 
Keywords
body, Islam, jihad, race, terror
! e need for better understanding of Islam and of Muslim politics is as great as ever. 
In the midst of explosive headline events and acts of violence not only in the Muslim 
world but also now in the West, the temptation remains to view Islam through the 
prism of religious extremism and terrorism.1
! e idea of Islam as an anti-Western monolith is absurd; cultural and poli-
tical diversity is evident throughout both the Islamic Crescent and major 
“Westernized” regions such as North America, Western Europe and 
Australasia. While journalists and academics often speak of a clash of civi-
lizations between Islam and “the West,” they themselves can also be 
“accused of regarding ‘the West’ as homogenous and of overlooking the 
1) Esposito 1992, p. ix.
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fractures and fi ssures that have always existed within it.”2 Increasing global 
mobility and the growing ascendancy of various indigenous rights move-
ments highlight the fragmented and partial nature of cultural identities; 
indeed although I am ethnically White and “Western-educated,” I live in 
Malaysia, which markets itself as “truly Asian,” and in the state of Tereng-
ganu, where most people are Muslim.
While the terms “Western” and “Muslim” are in many ways theoreti-
cally problematic – people increasingly identify with multiple cultural tra-
ditions3 – the terms do still have some usefulness within the context of 
political and religious extremism. ! e link between the racialized body 
and human rights discourses is evident through the increased stigma that 
overtly Muslim people have faced in Westernized nations in recent years. 
And while Muslim extremists are as responsible for the injurious carica-
tures as “Westernized” media sources, many more Muslims (and even 
some non-Muslims) suff er from injurious stereotypes than support such 
religious extremism. ! is articles focuses explicitly on the Western media, 
not on religious extremists, since they should, perhaps, be held to a higher 
intellectual standard.
Polemical and simplistic classifi cations such as “good” and “evil” mar-
ginalize the similarities between the Islamic faith and Christian belief; par-
allels acknowledged by both Prophet Muhammad and Pope John Paul II.4 
Crude religious labels such as “evildoers” and the “axis of evil” alienate 
Muslim governments, hide the legitimate political aspirations of Muslim 
people, and construct Western sensibilities as the only legitimate way of 
life. For example, when former US President George W. Bush mocked 
the Taliban for living and hiding in mountainside caves, he promoted 
the injurious and historically fi ctitious stereotype of Islam as primitive 
and Afghanis as subhuman. ! ese representations are also supported by 
spurious and ahistorical popular media representations of Afghanistan as 
“frozen in time.”5
2) Murji 2002, p. 240.
3) After all, it is possible for an individual to identify as, for example, an Afghani citizen, a 
Muslim, and a US resident all at once.
4) “In his early preaching, Muhammad had looked to the Jews and Christians of Arabia as 
natural allies whose faiths had much in common with Islam.” Esposito 1991, p. 17; Pope 
John Paul II embraced Muslims as ‘God loving people’ since it “fl ows from our fi delity to 
God and supposes that we know how to recognise God by faith.” John Paul II 1991, pp. 
42-3.
5) See for example, Fathers 2000, pp. 36-41.
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Although there are often signifi cant religious diff erences between Islam 
and Christianity and cultural diff erences between Muslims and Western-
ers, the eff ects of these diff erences are also often overstated. Across both the 
Islamic Crescent and throughout the more Westernized nations there are 
many variations that do not preclude social cohesion and peaceful interac-
tion, but which are important for theories about and treatment of Mus-
lim bodies; compare Afghanistan, which is poor and conservative, and the 
United Arab Emirates, which is wealthy and liberal. ! is has particular 
implications for human rights discourses surrounding racial embodiment 
as a particular facet of human corporeality; sensationalized media cover-
age constitute racial discrimination in its own right, but the idea of ethnic 
embodiment as a marker of religious faith also increases the stigma and 
hostility that many Muslims face in non-Muslim nations. In this article 
the relationships between ethnic embodiment, Islamic faith and human 
rights discourses are detailed at two separate levels; fi rstly, international 
politics and the body, and secondly, the body and individual practice.
Representing Islam
Stereotypes and sensationalist depictions of Other cultures alienate these 
people from those living in and/or identifying with the more Westernized 
parts of the world.6 Aside from famines, civil wars and accusations of polit-
ical corruption that intermittently strike African nations, most people in 
“Westernized” nations often hear very little about places such as Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Ethiopia and Rwanda. For similar reasons, and with spe-
cifi c reference to this article, there is also little discussion about everyday 
Central Asian and Middle Eastern Muslims except for the occasional news 
story about terrorism and human rights abuses in Afghanistan, Iran and 
the Palestinian territories. Because we rarely hear about Africans when they 
are not starving or Muslims when they are not terrorizing, these people’s 
everyday lives and legitimate aspirations are subconsciously forgotten.7
More specifi cally, as I have argued elsewhere,8 most “Westerners” mis-
understand jihad. In spite of the hundreds of books and thousands of 
articles published on topics such as Islam, Afghanistan, and jihad since 11 
6) Said 1978. 
7) One notable challenge to this mindset is Joe Sacco’s outstanding political cartoon, Pal-
estine. See, Sacco 2001.
8) See Tagg 2002, pp. 50–76. 
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September 2001 (over 150 books were published within the fi rst year), 
there still seems to be a great deal of confusion about even the most basic 
concepts. For example, the translation of the Arabic word jihad into the 
English phrase (and Christian concept) “holy war” is problematic for more 
than one reason. Firstly, “holy war” is most appropriately used to describe 
the Crusades against Muslims during the late Middle Ages, and secondly 
it is basically incorrect. Political analyst Fiona Symon suggests “struggle” 
as a more reasonable translation, given the explicit distinction between 
this Arabic word and the concept of qital (war).9 Western representations 
of jihad pay scant attention to the scriptural support for peaceful jihad; 
both the hadith suggesting jihad should only be a defensive act, as well 
as the hadith highlighting Prophet Mohammad’s distinction between 
al jihad al-asghar (the lesser jihad; armed confl ict) and al-jihad al-akbar 
(the greater jihad; the battle within one’s soul), which so central to liberal 
Islamic thought.
! ere are real implications associated with the way that the “Western” 
popular media – particularly news media and mainstream fi lm – reduces 
jihad to a one-dimensional caricature of terrorism as religious martyrdom. 
Such representations, combined with the stereotype “of the dreadful Turk, 
clad in a long robe and brandishing his scimitar”10 are partly based on 
cultural assumptions about the polarity of white and black (European 
and African embodiment) so typically used to distinguish good and evil.11 
Edward Said, for example, described the popular image of “the Arab leader 
(of marauders, pirates, “native” insurgents) snarling at the captured West-
ern hero and the blonde girl (both of them steeped in wholesomeness).”12 
Popular fi lms such as True Lies include representations of terrorist leaders 
as fanatical psychotics.13 Such representations – “why else would anyone 
hate the US?” – dismiss legitimate grievances many Muslims (and non-
Muslims) have with US foreign policy. Representations of terrorists as 
psychotic are also quite incompatible with actual security footage showing 
al-Qaeda terrorists on 11 September 2001 as focused, inconspicuous and 
calmly methodical. ! e realization that militants could make a carefully 
 9) Symon 2001. 
10) Peters 1979, p. 4.
11) Entman and Rojecki 2000.
12) Said 1978, p. 287. See the Epilogue, in particular, for further discussion of the pur-
ported relationship between moral purity and blonde embodiments. 
13) See Cameron 1994. Script courtesy of Carlton College Media Studies.
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calculated decision to kill innocent US citizens, and that such organiza-
tions can attract new recruits, raises a challenge to take more seriously 
Muslim’s legitimate grievances.
While in many ways suicide may seem both incomprehensible and 
totally irrational, many cultures sometimes privilege group solidarity over 
individual wellbeing in certain circumstances. Pulitzer prize-winning jour-
nalist Choe Sang-Hun recently argued that through suicide, disgraced 
former South Korean president Roh Moo-hyan “transformed [his public 
image] into that of an honorable man who chose suicide to defend his 
reputation.”14 Despite the obvious justifi cation for a rational ethical cri-
tique of such cultural norms, Roh may have acted rationally given this 
social context. ! e degree of irony that can be read into the article’s title – 
“In death, Roh reverses his fortunes again” – may simply depend on one’s 
cultural perspective; just a few days later the front page of ! e Daily Tele-
graph read “Brown fi ghts for his life,” as members of the British Prime 
Minister’s Labour Party attempted to force him from offi  ce.15
Furthermore, the development of religious extremism seems to demand 
not only fundamentalist ideology but also extreme poverty, and in this 
sense attacking the centre of global capitalism makes as much sense as 
killing oneself and one’s family in what Susan George describes as ! ai-
land and Korea’s “IMF suicides” during the Asian economic crisis.16 While 
violence against innocent civilians is utterly reprehensible, the reality is 
that in a world where the distribution of economic capital is increasingly 
uneven, global military and economic centers will be prone to attack. ! e 
following section further discusses the relationship between militant jihad 
and (neo)colonialism.
Islam, Jihad and Colonialism 
Charles Adams argues that the “groundswell of disillusionment with the 
path that most Muslim societies have traversed during the modern period” 
emerged as early as the 1930s;17 according to Fiona Symon this intensifi ed 
into the modern anti-Western militant jihad sentiment in the 1950s.18 
14) Choe, 2009, p. 16.
15) See Porter and Kirkup 2009, p. 1.
16) George 2003, p. 22.
17) Adams 1986, p. xii.
18) Symon 2001, n.p.
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Sayed Qutb, an intellectual in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood triggered 
this transformation.19 Qutb made a public claim that even “people of the 
book” should now be considered infi dels, marking a decisive move away 
from support for military jihad only against foreign occupiers of Muslim 
lands.20 Qutb’s line of thought originally emerged from being tortured in 
former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Naser’s jail, and from reading the 
fourteenth century writings of Shaykh Ahmad Ibn ‘Abd al-Halim Ibn 
Taymiya, a man who had hardline views about militant jihad and a ten-
dency to challenge authority. Taymiya argued that any “ruler who fails to 
enforce the shari’a rigorously in all its aspects, including the performance 
of jihad, forfeits his right to rule.”21 Controversially, he also asserted that 
all Muslims must follow strict Islamic law or risk being cast as infi dels, 
thus setting the foundations for the contemporary hardline Islamism 
movement. 
If such interpretations of Islamic theology seem immoderate, when 
placed in the context of the historical and material conditions of mid-
eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century Egyptian society, it refl ects a simple 
detestation of British imperialism. Although pre-colonial Egyptian society 
was far from egalitarian, the British exasperated the poverty of the major-
ity while simultaneously giving rise to a small prosperous Western-friendly 
upper middle class. Issues of economic disparity quickly led to debates 
centered on the future of traditional Egyptian culture.22 Naturally the poli-
tics of body culture were crucial to this transformation, and both ethnicity 
and veiling came to be seen as key issues.
Qutb’s condemnation of Westernization became a matter of concern 
for Egypt’s liberal political establishment. In 1966 Qutb was executed for 
calling Naser an infi del, and for urging his assassination. Qutb’s death by 
no means aff ected the popularity of his philosophies: they surged in the 
aftermath of Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel.23 Many Muslims 
became disillusioned during this period, and a number of them are today 
infl uential fi gures; for example, former Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Abdullah Azzam, a prominent Palestinian scholar, PLO fi ghter and 
19) Sivan 1985, p. 21.
20) Supported by the argument that democracy implies acceptance of the rulers, and 
implicit support for them.
21) Streusand 1997.
22) Ahmed 1992, p. 148.
23) Azzam Tamimi cited in Symon 2001, n.p.
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Afghan mujahedeen fi ghter. In fact, the latter’s involvement in the Afghan 
war against the Soviets is central to understanding contemporary terror-
ism-as-jihad, because he was a university lecturer of Osama bin Laden, and 
together they traveled to Afghanistan to resist the Soviet invasion.24
For their own individual political reasons, many nation states supported 
this successful Afghan war-as-jihad against the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia’s 
ruling family was having diffi  culty selling their pro-Western stance to the 
populace, the United States was intimidated by the Communist threat, 
and Pakistan used the jihad movement to promote the fi ght against India 
for Kashmir.25 While according to Saudi Islamist Saad al-Faqih, great care 
was taken by his country’s scholars to avoid talking “in terms of a jihad 
against anyone other than the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan,” the dra-
matic success of the war nurtured a broader “mentality of jihad.”26 After 
defeating the Soviets, nothing seemed impossible. Even though Abdul-
lah Azzam advocated Middle Eastern fi ghters’ return home after the war 
in Afghanistan, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad – an off shoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood – promoted very diff erent ideas. In particular the Egyptian 
Islamist Ayman al-Zawahri wished to continue fi ghting until the entire 
Islamic world was liberated from foreign infl uence.
Prior to his assassination in 1989, and the eruption of the Gulf War in 
1991, Azzam’s view was very much a minority opinion. ! ese two events 
and specifi cally “infi del” troops stationed on the Arabian Peninsula to fi ght 
Iraq – a fellow Muslim country – provided legitimacy to appeals for anti-
Western policy; after “devoting their lives to the liberation of Muslim ter-
ritory from foreign occupation, it was a bitter blow for Bin Laden and his 
Arab mujahideen to see land they regarded as sacred occupied by “infi del” 
soldiers.”27 Douglas Streusand maintains that the “Palestinian question” is 
another central concern of Islamists, including extremists such as Osama 
bin Laden. 
24) “It was there [King Abdul-Aziz University] that bin Laden fi rst became associated with 
the Muslim Brotherhood [and] . . . came under the spell of two prominent teachers of 
Islamic studies, Abdullah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb,” even if Azzam might not approve 
of bin Laden’s subsequent terrorist activities. Berger 2001, p. 52. 
25) Afghanistan, Amnesty International Publications.
26) Saad al-Faqih, cited in Symon 2001, n.p.
27) Symon 2001, n.p.
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Jihad and the Liberal Media
In light of this brief historical outline, this section examines the relation-
ship between physical embodiment and human rights discourses within 
the context of a political cartoon published in late October 2001. Although 
political cartoons are generally taken less seriously and interrogated less 
rigorously than other forms of political commentary, the combination of 
visual imagery and written text actually means that they can be very rich 
sites for textual analysis. Political cartoons are an important medium for 
analysis; consider, for example, the publicity received by infl ammatory 
depictions of Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-
Posten.
I am particularly interested in analyzing this cartoon (shown below) 
because it was published in Critic, a small liberal/radical student newspa-
per based at the University of Otago in New Zealand; in a sense, precisely 
because it seems to have little popular appeal. Yet despite appealing pri-
marily to an intellectual audience (and a generally liberal/radical one at 
that), this cartoon still relies on a number of injurious and racist assump-
tions about Muslim people in order to make its point.
Figure 1 Political cartoon emphasizing the humanity of 
ordinary Afghanis28
28) In Critic 2001, p. 8.
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! e central theme in the cartoon (above) is the apparent inequality between 
Westernized people and those of Other cultures within the “Western 
imagination.” An image of a man and child walking near the collapsing 
World Trade Centre has a very clear meaning: the indominability and 
unity of US society, even in the face of great adversity. But this image has a 
very diff erent and more specifi cally political meaning when mirrored by an 
Afghani man and child under a US-sponsored air raid; it refl ects the moral 
price that people in the US must pay in order to preserve their freedom.29 
Cleverly, the cartoon draws attention to our own inherent attitudes about 
the relative acceptability of Westerners and non-Westerners under fi re, 
based upon racist stereotypes that justify the foreign policies of power-
ful Western nations. For example, while Westerners are understandably 
horrifi ed by the destruction of the World Trade Centre, the mainstream 
media in Westernized nations tend to be relatively apathetic to warfare and 
poverty in third world countries, assuming perhaps that this is simply the 
“natural” order. It is only when these two images are placed beside each 
other that the contradiction become clear.
But yet even this progressive cartoon reinforces many popular ste-
reotypes of Westernized and Afghani lifestyles, and of Westernized and 
Afghani bodies. To begin with, it is interesting to note the ethnicity of 
the two men, the boy and all seven of the background fi gures on the US 
side of the cartoon. In particular, note the classic “all American” image 
epitomized by snowy blonde hair. ! at the US is represented this way is 
fascinating, because most New Yorkers do not have hair this color; accord-
ing to the 2000 US Census, only 67.9% of people in New York State were 
even of “White” ethnicity.30 My own personal experience (as a blonde 
man) visiting New York City in late 2002 confi rmed my suspicion that 
the dominant phenotypes of black or brown hair are widely prevalent, 
even among White New Yorkers. ! at the three New Yorkers featured in 
the fi rst cartoon have uncharacteristically blonde hair is signifi cant because 
of the cultural associations traditionally linked to blonde embodiment, 
most pertinently the concept of innocence.31 Even though the purity 
of the blonde (as compared to the passion of dark people) is tradition-
ally described within the context of female sexuality, the link between 
29) See Smith 2000, for a similar argument.
30) US Census Bureau website, http://factfi nder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_
id=04000US36&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U. 
31) Warner 1994.
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innocence and blondness is also apparent within a number of other con-
texts, none less than representation of nation. Since the US is a multi-
cultural society,32 it seems as absurd to reduce its citizens to a blonde 
stereotype as it is to defi ne all Muslims as terrorists. 
It is interesting to consider why the cartoonist has chosen four males to 
represent the people of Afghanistan and the United States. While Afghan-
istan’s city markets are almost exclusively a male preserve, in the coun-
tryside women enjoy greater freedoms. Yet if the point is to highlight the 
general “invisibility” of women in Afghani social and political life, then 
it curious that all the characters on the US side of the cartoon are either 
clearly male or of indiscernible gender. Even without seeing the man’s face 
(and although he is walking the boy down the middle of a busy Manhattan 
street), he appears thoroughly trustworthy: tall, strong and stereotypically 
attractive, his hands clasp fi rmly around the boy’s, symbolizing trust and 
security in the face of adversity. In spite of the plethora of representations 
in the Western media of Afghanis as starved, crippled and fanatical, the 
man on the right hand side of the cartoon does appear rather “wholesome.” 
Yet the young Afghani boy’s hand is held relatively loosely, in far weaker 
style, suggesting perhaps that the Afghani man is less willing to protect his 
child; and there is a certain feeling that the boy might get left behind. 
! e clothing that adorns the men and boys also tell a certain story about 
what sort of people they are. While a cartoon is a far less explicit form than 
most representations of Afghani people, the marks on the back of the boy’s 
shirt suggest that people from Afghanistan are unclean; the dirt and rubble 
near the building reinforces this. Groomed in typical and appropriate dress 
for his part of the world, his face is unshaven and his hair is covered with 
a turban. While the New York man is tidy, i.e. wholesome, he does not 
wear a suit that might imply he is the cliché urban city workaholic; neither 
is the man drawn in bohemian style, which could taint his “all-American” 
appeal. ! is man appears thoroughly clean cut – the stereotypical image of 
the ideal father eff ortlessly balancing his work and family life. Although it 
appears the man is a working professional – he has the fi nancial resources 
to purchase tidy clothing, maintain a highly groomed appearance and 
function in an expensive part of town – he still has suffi  cient free time 
to take that Tuesday morning off  to spend with the child. Finally, the 
belts that the boy and the man wear represent a physical asset the Afghani 
lacks, but more importantly symbolizes the comfort, support and perhaps 
32) Wynter 2002.
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superiority of the Westernized lifestyles (the belt is obviously not simply a 
matter of representing national dress, since the Afghani boy also wears one 
of the US’s cultural icons, a t-shirt).
! e scenery and environment also tell a story of the relationship between 
society and nature that reinforces the idea of Muslims as socially, economi-
cally and morally primitive; itself a tacit assumption that demands a post-
colonial critique. While skyscrapers, people and cars dominate the image 
on the left, mountains and empty desert feature on the right.33 ! e implicit 
message is that while people from Western nations control and dominate 
their environment, nature dictates to Afghanis. Manhattan is obviously an 
enormous metropolis, yet – for a cartoon emphasizing similarities between 
US citizens and Afghanis – it is bizarre that a rural setting is chosen to 
represent Afghanistan; Kabul is a city with many cars, buildings, busy mar-
ketplaces, crowded streets, and had, at the time, almost one and a quarter 
million residents.34 ! e representation of New York as necessarily a “centre 
of empire” and Afghanistan as peripheral is also historically incongruous, 
considering that Kabul is an ancient city strategically located at the apex 
of the major trade routes between Africa, Asia and Europe. Furthermore, 
the images of tall buildings, expensive cars and busy people highlight an 
apparently obvious – yet totally fallacious – distinction between Western-
ers’ natural creativity and rationality in contrast to the irrationality and 
petty destructiveness of the Muslim Afghani. It is far too easy for people 
living in Westernized nations to blame the Taliban for all Afghanistan’s 
woes, and forget the critical role of US-Soviet relations during the Cold 
War, and the role of the CIA in creating and supporting the Taliban.35 It is 
also tempting to assume that material success is the only credible criterion 
for judging a rational political ideology. Despite these racist characteriza-
tions of Afghanis, the inability to deal with rational arguments is as much 
of a problem for US citizens as for Afghanis.
33) Despite this representation, Afghanistan is not totally barren; indeed as Afghanistan’s 
interim leader, Hamid Karzai points out it is “a country that has mountains, snow, deserts, 
forests, lakes and wonderful rivers.” Karzai, cited in British Broadcasting Corporation News 
2002.
34) According to Fazil Karim, Mayor of Kabul, that city’s population nearly doubled to 2.3 
million residents after the fall of the Taliban administration. Karim, cited in the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c website, http://www.
unescap.org/unis/press/2002/jul/g_19_02.htm.
35) Rashid 2000; El Guindi 1999, p. xii.
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! e only major feature I have yet to discuss with regard to this cartoon 
is, of course, the aircraft. Even though it is obvious that there are aircraft 
on both sides of the cartoon, the meanings we associate with these two 
sets of planes are radically diff erent. Indeed, while the aircraft on the right 
side stand out as the only objects of modern technology, those on the left 
symbolize the alleged backwardness and simplicity of the Muslim world. 
While al-Qaeda is arguably the most complex and international terrorist 
organization in history, and although the World Trade attacks required 
extraordinary planning, organization and discipline, the actual event is 
often remembered as a simple “box-cutter” incident; one of the fi rst anti-
terrorism measures implemented was the removal and banning of all metal 
butter-knives from many airlines. 
! e central message of this cartoon is clearly that both Afghanis and US 
citizens suff er as a result of acts of violence. But that the cartoon is both 
necessary and so striking suggests an underlying belief that US military 
action serves to liberate people, and that all terrorist attacks are an attempt 
to undermine freedom; yet scant reference is made to the argument that 
both attacks were a simple response to a direct political threat.36 ! e idea 
that all terrorists are terrible “evildoers” will be discussed and refuted 
within the context of the next cartoon, which was published on the same 
page as the fi rst cartoon. 
Stereotyping Muslims
! e man in the following cartoon represents the popular belief and conve-
nient stereotype within polite society and echoed by Western diplomats 
that all terrorists are fanatical extremists, terrible “evildoers” and most pen-
itently, the enemies of freedom and reason.37 ! is position is irreconcilable 
with the personal histories of many liberal political icons such as Nelson 
Mandela and George Washington, who also fi t the popular – although
36) At least one New Zealand newspaper cited a senior US diplomat who said that “far from 
launching the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon out of 
the blue 10 days ago,” the terrorist attacks were “a pre-emptive strike” in response to direct 
and specifi c threats. New Zealand Herald 2002.
37) It is interesting to compare the physical and ethnic embodiment of the man in this 
cartoon (balding/Jewish) with that from the previous one (handsome/White). 
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Figure 2 Political cartoon highlighting ignorance about 
Muslims’ grievances38 
politically and emotionally charged – contemporary defi nition of terrorist, 
even though their progressive agendas were incomparable to Osama bin 
Laden’s.39 
Indeed it appears that any Muslim who takes part in political activities 
can now be freely accused of terrorism;40 the suicide bombers in Israel and 
elsewhere sustain the myth that Islamic activists – even legitimate ones
38) Critic 2001, p. 8.
39) ! e South African Government eff ectively labeled Mandela a terrorist; he was convicted 
of incitement to sabotage, treason, and violent conspiracy. Initially, it was a category that 
most Western governments accepted. Mandela 1994.
40) “A former Afghanistan Government Minister [Dr Najbullah Lafraie] given refugee sta-
tus in New Zealand a year ago is a guerrilla leader who was involved in a bloody holy war, 
says National leader Jenny Shipley.” Roughan and Gleeson 2002. ! e accusations were 
later proved groundless, and Dr Lafraie continues to work in New Zealand. 
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such as Yasir Arafat – fi ght only for tyranny. But in order to present the 
military response as virtuous, right wing politicians in Europe and North 
America also resorted to racial religious stereotypes of Muslim terrorists 
as ranting madmen. Less than a month after the 11 September attacks, 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi pointed out “the superiority of 
our [Western] culture [over Islamic culture].”41 In 1996, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen – the runner up to the 2002 French presidential elections – described 
Islam as a “frightening phenomenon” that threatens to steal the souls of 
Frenchmen.42 
! e religious and racial stereotyping of Muslims that is still evident in 
contemporary Westernized political cultures gives tacit support for a whole 
range of human rights abuses – both in the political vacuum of Guanta-
namo Bay and in Westernized nations themselves. In 2002, a close friend 
of mine grew a lihyah (a long beard) as a mark of solidarity with his fellow 
Muslims. However, he found it problematic to wear such an overt symbol, 
so often associated with radical Islam, in both a small New Zealand city 
and when travelling to academic conferences. Ironically, just a few months 
later (with beard shaved) he returned to his homeland and became a legiti-
mate militant; a Captain (now Major) in his nation’s armed services.
Extremist rhetoric about Islam is only possible in “post-September 11” 
society because the media confl ate the distinction between terrorists, Mus-
lims, and Arabs.43 Bush, for example, claimed that the terrorists “hate our 
freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, [and] our free-
dom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”44 Broad sweeping 
statements such as these play on our emotions, particularly our encultured 
religious perceptions of a clear distinction between what is “good” and 
what is “evil” (it would be rather diffi  cult to argue that former “terror-
ist” Nelson Mandela resents freedom). While these accusations might be 
true of al-Qaeda, it is unlikely that this is why they destroyed the World 
Trade Centre. Bush simply wished to dehumanize those Muslims who 
threatened him, and marginalizing legitimate grievances associated with 
US “imperialism” was crucial to justifying a violent reaction.
41) Berlusconi, quoted in TIME Magazine 2001, p. 11.
42) ! is “frightening phenomenon imposes its customs, values, its religion, and steals our 
souls . . . the tide of immigration will submerge us after fi rst having ruined us.” Jean-Marie 
Le Pen quoted in Crumbie 2002, p. 35.
43) Said 1996.
44) Roy 2001a.
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Ironically, while Bush defended the war as protecting freedom, some 
scholars proposed an alternative interpretation; as the US becomes more 
and more globally dominant, the less and less “democratic” its foreign pol-
icy appears.45 It is also paradoxical that the US Government implemented 
unprecedented restrictions on civil liberties to protect their nation against 
an alleged threat against freedom.46 If terrorists do resent the US for its 
freedom and democracy, and that was why they launched the attacks, then 
we need to consider why buildings so symbolic of the US’s, and in indeed 
all “Western,” global military and economic “imperialism” were targeted. 
! e Statue of Liberty, in contrast, is the defi nitive symbol of Western-style 
freedom and democracy. In the shadow of this argument, persuading US 
citizens that their nation’s freedom was under attack (as opposed to its for-
eign policy), appeared to be an easy means for rallying political support for 
a military response: Bush’s statement can be read as essentially a strategic 
political response. 
It is absurd to discriminate against all Muslims simply because a very 
few are terrorists. But perhaps rather naively, I expected tension with Arab 
Muslims would be negligible within the stable and isolated geopolitical 
region containing Australia and New Zealand.47 Unfortunately, a number 
of events in the six months after the attacks proved me wrong. I found 
the belief that “people are just a little weird over there” easy to reject as 
overly simplistic and fundamentally racist, yet its popularity in everyday 
discourse was rather disconcerting. I am still not entirely sure exactly 
where “there” is, or whether it is not actually a place but rather anyone 
who holds diff erent religious beliefs or cultural values, and whether, per-
haps, it is inextricably tied to ethnic embodiment. Geraldine Brooks, an 
45) “Could it be the stygian anger that led to the attacks has its taproot not in American 
freedom and democracy, but in the US government’s record of commitment and support 
to exactly the opposite things – to economic and military terrorism, insurgency, military 
dictatorship, religious bigotry, and unimaginable genocide (outside America)?” Roy 
2001a.
46) By just November 2001, eleven thousand suspects and material witnesses had been 
detained in America; many who had been cleared of terrorist connections were still “held 
under harsh conditions for prolonged periods, and denied a chance to notify relatives of 
their whereabouts.” New York Times 2001. According to Kate Martini, the director of the 
Centre for National Security Studies, this was “frighteningly close to the practice of disap-
pearing people in Latin America.” Martini quoted in Williams 2001a. 
47) For example, two British tourism polls cited New Zealand as the safest in the ‘post 11 
September’ world. Otago Daily Times 2001, p. 21.
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Australian journalist, described how people from such a politically stable 
and geographically isolated environment often have the most diffi  culty 
comprehending incidents of religious extremism in Muslim countries; 
which “come at us from so deep in left fi eld that we, as Westerners, have 
no coherent way to think about them. We shrug. Weird foreigners. Who 
understands them? Who needs to?”48
! e woman in the cartoon (above) represents moderate Muslims (par-
ticularly those aff ected by British imperialism and US foreign policy), 
and attempts to debunk the “weird foreigner” stereotype. Despite Bush’s 
assertions, and his government’s actions,49 empathizing with this cartoon 
woman does not necessarily suggest a lack of patriotism. As the Iranian 
religious leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei pointed out, it is possible to be 
neither “with” Bush (in supporting the war) nor with the terrorists (sup-
porting the trade centre attacks). He said this in rather unequivocal terms: 
“No, we [the Iranian government] are not with you, and we are not terror-
ists.”50 Indian essayist, activist and Booker prize-winning author Arund-
hati Roy agrees, asserting, “! e world doesn’t have to choose between the 
Taliban and the US Government. All the beauty of the world – literature, 
music, art – lies between these two fundamentalist poles.”51 In summary, 
Westerners should not only have been shocked by this unimaginable catas-
trophe; they should also be horrifi ed that it is a global political crisis only 
when it happens to a powerful Western nation.
Interestingly, many people I talked to in the days after the attack 
expressed outrage that I thought that the incident might be based on (but 
crucially, not justifi ed by) legitimate grievances, and that a military pres-
ence would provide convenient access to gas and oil reserves in nearby 
Turkmenistan.52 In fact it was only as the initial Afghani casualties began 
to emerge (and that their tales were quite diff erent to those proff ered by US 
48) Brooks 1995, p. 227.
49) Edward Said and philosopher Anatole Anton complained about harassment from gov-
ernment and university authorities because they opposed the methods of the Afghan war. 
Both men had “been threatened and attacked for speaking out.” Vulliamy and Helmore 
2001.
50) Time Magazine 2001, p. 11.
51) Roy 2001b.
52) Turkmenistan holds the third largest gas reserves in the world and some six billion bar-
rels of oil. In 1997, to negotiate the construction of an oil pipeline across Afghanistan, “a 
delegation of Taliban mullahs travelled to America and even met US State Department 
offi  cials and [oil giant] Unocal executives.” Roy 2001b.
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offi  cials), that a more mainstream anti-war sentiment began to grow. ! is 
is because Western Orientalist discourse makes little distinction between 
Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Afghanis, and at times even Muslims 
in general.53 For example, I can still remember a customer in a Turkish 
Kebab shop in New Zealand jesting to the worker “so that was you guys 
causing trouble in New York, eh?” ! e irony is that Turkey is a modern 
democratic secular nation, having more in common with the liberal West 
than radical Islam.
Despite the plethora of genuine criticisms of the Taliban, some reac-
tions to Afghani life simply refl ect diff erences in the priorities and values of 
the liberal West and conservative Islam. Aside from Western materialism 
and individualism there are many diff erent – and potentially equally legiti-
mate – parameters for judging the “worth” of a nation, culture, or way 
of life. For example, when US citizens declare their nation “the number 
one country in the world” they are clearly referring to their unparalleled 
economic and military dominance.54 It is not surprising that Westerners 
who look at the desperate poverty and restrictive way of life in pre- or post-
Taliban Afghanistan are stunned that many middle class Pakistanis revere 
their neighbors as “perfect,” and are prepared to fi ght and risk their lives to 
protect it.55 To a Western value system this makes absolutely no sense.
In fact what many Pakistanis admire about Afghanistan is precisely the 
opposite of what most Westerners admire about the US. ! is includes an 
ability to survive in an unimaginably harsh and tremendously unstable 
region of the world, compared to the generally high standard of living in US; 
Afghanis’ phenomenal generosity and hospitality,56 compared to Western 
culture of individualism and personal responsibility; and Afghani’s rigid 
adherence to politico-religious principles contrasts to Western alliances 
based on changing national interests (particularly their relationship with 
Pakistan). Essentially, while Westerners place ultimate value on material 
wealth and political stability, we should not be surprised that Afghanis are 
often interested in other matters.
53) See, for example, Roughan and Gleeson 2002.
54) For a general critique, see Schiller 2000.
55) Nicholas Kristof described the threat of Pakistan becoming ‘Talibanized.’ Kristof 2001, 
p. A39. 
56) Former British senior diplomat in Afghanistan, Sir Martin Ewans, describes how the 
people “carry hospitality to extremes, but are implacable as enemies.” See, Ewans 2002, 
dustjacket. 
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! e next section will discuss how our assumptions about socio-religious 
diff erence across the globe relate to racialized diff erences and the politics 
of Islamic bodies within the Western environment. After reiterating global 
social inequalities and their relationships to stereotypes of Muslims, I 
highlight some ways that racist stereotypes of Muslims in Islamic states 
also aff ect the treatment of Muslim (and Muslim-looking) people living in 
Westernized nations.
! e Needs of the Rich and the Needs of the Many
Arundhati Roy was among the earliest critics of the military response 
within Afghanistan. Central to her “algebra” is the profoundly unequal 
value placed on human life, depending on whether individuals live within 
a “friendly” or “unfriendly” nation state. She drew parallels between the 
“War on Terrorism” and the Gulf War; and queries, “How many dead 
Iraqis will it take to make the world a better place? How many dead 
Afghanis for every dead American?”57 ! e US military, in particular, is 
both widely revered and strongly criticized for the enormous lengths it 
takes to protect its soldiers’ lives, partly because at times it demonstrates an 
almost palpable disregard for indigenous casualties:
In 1996 Madeline Albright, then the U.S. secretary of state, was asked on national 
television what she felt about the fact that 500,000 Iraqi children had died as a result 
of U.S. economic sanctions. She replied that it was “a very hard choice,” but that, all 
things considered, “we think the price is worth it.”58
It is unlikely that such a cost in US lives would have presented such a dif-
fi cult choice. ! is is partly the case because news broadcasters in the devel-
oped world often gloss over major human tragedies where Western citizens 
are not directly aff ected. ! is is important for understanding the political 
signifi cance of the Islamic body because it reinforces what Edward Said 
describes as a “web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, 
57) “. . . How many dead women and children for every dead man? How many dead moja-
hedin for each dead investment banker?” Roy 2001a.
58) Roy 2001a. Peter Bergen notes that bin Laden also refers to these children when saying 
“a heart that kills hundreds of children defi nitely knows no words.” Bin Laden, cited in 
Bergen 2001, p. 22. 
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dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim,”59 which 
reduce our empathy for those in crisis.
Indeed there seem to be plenty of examples of Western rejection of 
Muslims in crisis, even before 11 September. When a large boatload of 
Afghani asylum seekers entered Australian waters, that country’s Federal 
Government passed controversial legislation designed to limit refugees 
from entering the country, despite criticism from the United Nations, the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the Refugee Coun-
cil of Australia and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid.60 Yusuf Has-
san of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights believed the 
Australian public accepted this legislation because of fallacious stereotypes 
of refugees as economic migrants or queue jumpers.61 Hassan added that 
in his experience of race relations within Australia, not even highly skilled 
migrants are made to feel particularly welcome.62
Even though Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
claimed that the “War on Terrorism” was not a war against Islam, it is still, 
at least, being constructed as being between peaceful and caring Western-
ers and the “evil doers” of the conservative Islamic world. For this reason, 
the novelist Salman Rushdie wrote an article called “Yes, this is about 
Islam,” highlighting how in order to maintain support for the coalition 
against terrorism and war in Afghanistan, Western leaders must constantly 
assert that this fi ght is not about Islam.63 While politically necessary, Rush-
die argues that this argument is a farce: “If this isn’t about Islam, why the 
worldwide Muslim demonstrations in support of Osama bin Laden and 
al-Qaeda?”64 Rushdie’s underlying theme is that in a subtle way this war is 
59) Said 1978, p. 27.
60) Australian Broadcasting Corporation News 2001.
61) British Broadcasting Corporation News 2001. Despite the stereotypes (which make sense 
to individualistic Westerners), many desperately poor children in refugee camps are deter-
mined to stay in Afghanistan and to rebuild their country: they were only prepared to make 
this journey – fraught with danger – because of the horrifi c situation in Afghanistan. ! e 
popular argument is that while asylum seekers cost taxpayers, foreign immigrants steal 
Australians’ jobs.
62) Although, in the New Zealand business context there is evidence to suggest Asian immi-
grants are considered both extremely productive and disciplined; see Heeringa 2002, p. 8.
63) Rushdie 2001. Rushdie has been living in exile since the late Iranian leader Ayatollah 
Khomeni deemed his novel ! e Satanic Verses blasphemous and issued a fatwa calling for 
his death.
64) Rushdie 2001.
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precisely about Islam: specifi cally about its heart and soul as well as the path 
of its political future.65 Just as British colonialism sought to dominate the 
political structure of the Orient, US neocolonialism is presently ensuring 
free access to Middle Eastern oil; demonizing the Arab nations and propa-
gating the myth that they are incapable of managing their own aff airs is the 
most eff ective means towards this end.
But while Western leaders maintain the war is not about Islam, they 
increasingly draw attention to and help promote the most radical elements 
of Islamic society. While only a small proportion of Muslims who resent 
Western support for Israel and troops in Saudi Arabia are prepared to take 
violent action, there is increasing widespread popularity of what Rush-
die calls paranoid Islam, “a jumbled, half-examined” version of the faith, 
hijacked for political purposes, and epitomized by the widespread popular 
support for Osama bin Laden.66 Muslims across the globe increasingly 
fi nd themselves having to choose between what is for them two radical 
extremes: liberal Americanism and radical Islam.
Racial Profi ling and Homeland Defense
Certain Muslims and non-Muslims in the US, Britain, Australia and even 
New Zealand face discrimination and abuse because of their ethnic iden-
tity and religious beliefs. Traditionally race-related issues in the US have 
been dominated by the extent to which racial profi ling of African Ameri-
cans occurs, particularly by White police offi  cers within the political con-
text of the US’s “war on drugs.”67 Yet, since the 11 September attacks, and 
in response to a phenomenal surge in allegations of anti-Islamic hate crimes 
and alleged discriminatory practices against Muslims in the US, the focus 
has changed markedly.
Alleged cases of racial profi ling involved lawsuits against American, 
Continental, United and Northwest Airlines.68 Such instances include a 
65) Perhaps it is also proving to be very much about the ‘heart and soul’ of America; the 
balance between protecting from external attacks on ‘freedom,’ and the rapid diminishing 
of civil liberties from within. See, New York Times 2001. 
66) Rushdie added that this, the fastest growing version of Islam, abhors the modem 
Western lifestyle and “blames outsider, ‘infi dels’, for all the ills of Muslim societies.” 
Rushdie 2001.
67) See Meeks 2000.
68) See CNN News 2001a, and CNN News 2001b.
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number of passengers of various ethnic groups, but including people of 
Iranian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Filipino, and Indian origin. Despite the 
wide range of physical appearances, these men shared a common experi-
ence; after passing through security measures, each was escorted off  their 
fl ight, and, in a number of cases detained and questioned about their reli-
gious faith, work and martial status. Many of the complainants reported 
that the pilots, fl ight crews and other passengers commented that they did 
not like how they looked, or that they were uncomfortable fl ying with 
them, and, unsurprisingly, all were non-White US citizens. ! ese extreme 
cases refl ect a pattern of stigma that spread far beyond US shores; in 2002, 
as noted earlier, a New Zealand-based friend and colleague elected to 
grow a long beard in order to express solidarity with his Muslim “broth-
ers.” However, overt stigma and open harassment – both on international 
fl ights and in day-to-day life – meant that this expression was relatively 
short-lived. 
Of clear interest in relation to lawsuits cited above is the historical and 
political context in which they have occurred; but of further, and less obvi-
ous interest, is the legislative context for claims of racial discrimination. 
When the US Congress passed an “End Racial Profi ling Act” on 6 June 
2001, President Bush said that racial profi ling is “wrong and we will end 
it in America”; Senator Jon Corzine added that it is also ineff ective for 
combating crime.69 Yet, less than four months later, and in response to 
the 11 September terrorist attacks, the United States Congress passed the 
controversial USA Patriot Act. According to Professor Susan Herman, the 
“thrust of the USA Patriot Act surveillance provisions is to provide federal 
agencies with more surveillance options, and less judicial supervision.”70
! e specifi c importance of criticism of the US Patriot Act regards the 
type of people who tend to be suspected of terrorist activities within “post-
11 September” United States, as well as the potential eff ectiveness of such 
legislation. According to Herman, some “5000 Arab residents between the 
ages of 18 and 33 have been summoned for interrogation by the FBI.”71 
Colombia University Law Professor Patricia Williams confi rmed this fi g-
ure, adding that it appears these individuals “have been selected according 
69) See Bush, quoted in Mucchetti 2005, p. 12 and Corzine, quoted in Mucchetti 2005, 
p. 8. 
70) Herman n.d.
71) Williams 2001a.
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to their ethnicity or religion.”72 Furthermore, Williams argued that the US 
Patriot Act has only been justifi ed within the post-September 11 political 
climate, where a signifi cant proportion of US citizens “suddenly seem will-
ing to embrace profi ling based on looks and ethnicity; detention without 
charges; searches without warrants; and even torture and assassination,” all 
of which the US Patriot Act either explicitly permitted or subtly implied.73 
! is is despite Corzine’s position that racial profi ling is both ineff ective 
and morally wrong.
As I pointed out as early as 2002, it is hardly surprising that racial profi l-
ing of terrorists was no more successful than racial profi ling of drug traf-
fi ckers.74 Crucial to the success of Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh, 
Florida suicide pilot Charles Bishop75 and the recent al-Qaeda terrorists 
was that each man was remarkably inconspicuous. In light of the alleged 
international nature of the terrorist organization, and the fact that they 
have already made obvious their eff orts to blend in, it seems absurd to 
simply screen people on the basis of their ethnic identity.76 While a lone 
microbiologist probably caused the anthrax scare in the US, the FBI did 
not question the relatively small number of microbiologists within the 
country, but it felt the need to interview an enormous number of Arab 
and Muslim US citizens even though the FBI had no evidence of their 
involvement with al-Qaeda.77 ! e passing of the USA Patriot Act and its 
functional superseding of the End Racial Profi ling Act within the context 
of the war on terrorism suggest that the Muslim, Arab and ethnic body 
is precariously placed within the contemporary Western imagination. In 
what was, and in many ways still is, a paranoid political climate, forms of 
“Otherness” are viewed with staunch scepticism; ethnic embodiment and 
physical characteristics, whether biological or cultural, provide an unassail-
able marker of those for whom a vocal minority claim do not “belong” in 
Western society.
72) Herman n.d.
73) Williams 2001b.
74) Tagg 2002: 126.
75) Koch 2002. 
76) Indeed Charles Bishop was an US citizen who simply sympathized with al-Qaeda. 
77) Patricia Williams 2001a. 
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Conclusion
Western media interests that concentrate on confl icts in the Middle East 
play a role in creating the illusion that all Muslims are radical fundamen-
talists. By rarely acknowledging anything other than turmoil in these states, 
they subtly portray a narrow, albeit newsworthy, monolithic expression of 
Islam as primitive, fl awed and oppressive. Muslims propagating an inher-
ently peaceful view of Islam must fi rst unravel a multitude of stereotypes 
before they can lay their arguments, and despite the growing global sig-
nifi cance of Islamic fundamentalism, too often little eff ort is made to con-
sider the historical roots of the current anti-Western sentiment. So even if 
these grievances are now simply a rhetorical troupe to legitimate al-Qaeda 
actions, they remain key issues that capture Muslims imaginations.
Many contemporary media representations of Muslims often negate the 
lived realities and day-to-day aspirations of Muslim people; it is in this 
sense that all representations of Islam, even those in seemingly trivial con-
texts such as cartoons, may perpetuate racist stereotypes. While it is hardly 
surprising that the off ensive cartoons published in Jyllands-Posten were 
off ensive to Muslims, this article has shown that even overtly progressive 
cartoons published in liberal academic-affi  liated publications also often 
rely on shallow caricatures in order to present their arguments.
Finally, media representations of Islam have profound eff ects on the 
lived experiences of Muslims across the globe. While progressive liberal 
commentaries perform a crucial role in undermining racist representations 
furthered by both (neo)colonialism and extremism alike, this article out-
lines a framework for considering some of the ways in which even pro-
gressive commentators may themselves inadvertently rely on injurious 
stereotypes. Without all liberal political commentators critically interro-
gating their own latent sensibilities, Muslims will continue to face persecu-
tion from ignorant Westerners and will be continually pressured to choose 
between two polemical caricatures of the Islamic faith. ! e path to greater 
understanding and mutual respect between Muslims and non-Muslims 
lies through a full and frank discussion of the issues concerning all parties, 
and I would like to suggest that the continued consideration of injurious 
stereotypes in both mainstream and liberal media should form an integral 
part of this process. 
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